
## **The Functional Organization of English Clauses**

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
### A. Basics of Cognitive Grammar

- (1)(a) Language allows the **symbolization** of conceptualizations by phonological sequences.
  - (b) Cognitive Grammar posits only the minimum needed for this purpose: **semantic structures**, **phonological structures**, and **symbolic links** between them.
  - (c) Lexicon and grammar form a continuum consisting in assemblies of such structures.
  - (d) Grammar is therefore **meaningful** (not an autonomous, purely formal system).
- (2)(a) **Conceptualization** is *dynamic*, *interactive*, and *imaginative*, including: (i) ongoing conceptual activity (not just established "concepts"); (ii) sensory, motor, and emotive experience; (iii) apprehension of the physical, social, and linguistic context; and (iv) many kinds and levels of mental construction.
  - (b) **Semantic structure** is conceptualization recruited and adapted for linguistic purposes. It flexibly invokes an elaborate **conceptual substrate** of indefinite extent. There is no sharp distinction between "linguistic" and "extra-linguistic meaning".
  - (c) Linguistic meaning depends on both the conceptual "content" invoked and how that content is **construed** (e.g. *dynamicity*, *metaphor*, *specificity*, *prominence*, *perspective*).
- (3)(a) There is a road alongside the coast between Ventura and Santa Barbara.
  - (b) A road runs along the coast from Ventura to Santa Barbara.
- (4)(a) Prices were much higher at the end of July than at the beginning.
  - (b) Prices {rose / soared / skyrocketed} in July.
- (5)(a) **Specificity**: the level of precision and detail at which a situation is characterized.
  - (b) (SCHEMATIC) Something changed. → Prices rose. → Food prices skyrocketed. (SPECIFIC)
- (6)(a) Within the array of conceptual content an expression evokes (the **base**), its **profile** is the entity it is conceived as designating, or referring to (its conceptual referent).
  - (b) Expressions with the same content can differ semantically due to profiling.
  - (c) An expression can profile either a **thing** or a **relationship** (abstractly defined).




- (8)(a) **Trajector** (tr): The *primary focal participant* in a profiled relationship; the entity conceived as being located, characterized, or otherwise described.
  - (b) Landmark (lm): A secondary focal participant, invoked for that purpose.
  - (c) Expressions with the same content and the same profiling can differ semantically by their choice of trajector and landmark.

(9)



- (10)(a) When is the parade? (i) The parade (**tr**) is right after the ceremony (**lm**).
  - (ii) \*The ceremony (tr) is right before the parade (lm).
  - (b) When is the ceremony? (i) The ceremony (tr) is right before the parade (lm).
    - (ii) \*The parade (tr) is right after the ceremony (lm).



C = viewer; conceptualizer; subject of conception

MS = visual field; full scope of awareness; maximal scope


IS = general locus of attention; focal area; "onstage region"; immediate scope


F = focus of attention; profile; object of conception

(12) Vantage point:




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




- (14)(a) body > arm > hand > finger > knuckle
  - (b) fingertip; fingernail; toenail; eyelash; eyelid; eyeball
  - (c) \*bodytip; \*armnail; \*legnail; \*facelash; \*bodylid; \*headball
  - (d) He {washed / was washing} his cat.

(15)







- (16)(a) I was at this fancy party, and the mayor was sitting right across the table.
  - (b) I was at this fancy party, and the mayor was sitting right across the table from me.

(17)

(a) across the table




(b) across the table from me



- (18)(a) An expression's **grammatical category** is based on its *profile* (not its overall content).
  - (b) A *noun* profiles a **thing** (defined abstractly as a product of *conceptual reification*).
  - (c) A *verb* profiles a **process** (a relationship tracked in its evolution through time).
  - (d) An *adjective* profiles a **non-processual relationship** with a **single** focused participant.
  - (e) A preposition profiles a non-processual relationship with multiple focused participants.

(19) (a) enter Abbreviatory notations: (b) break t (c) broken t (20)(a) kill (b) killer (c) entry


- (21)(a) Like a verb, a **clause** profiles a *process*. Like a noun, a **nominal** profiles a *thing*.
  - (b) A **subject** is a nominal that specifies a *trajector*. An **object** specifies a *landmark*.
  - (c) In a complex expression, the **head** is the element that imposes its profile on the whole.




- (23)(a) Expressions are *assemblies* of symbolic structures, and **constructions** (grammatical "rules") are *conventional patterns* for putting such assemblies together.
  - (b) Constructions are themselves symbolic assemblies, but **schematic** rather than specific.
  - (c) In constructions, **conceptual integration** is *symbolized* by **phonological integration**.
  - (d) The **composite structure** obtained by integrating **component structures** can itself function as component structure at a higher level of organization (**constituency**).

# B. Substrate, Function, System, and Expression

(1)




- (2)(a) Some language use is non-interactive (e.g. Damn!; Ow!; Ouch).
  - (b) Expressions used interactively are aimed at getting the hearer to respond in some way:
    (i) with a non-linguistic action; (ii) by a change in knowledge or attitude; (iii) with a linguistic response; (iv) as part of the offstage speaker-hearer interaction (e.g. using a filler to hold the floor: *He's...uh...very...uh...competitive*).
  - (c) The minimum, **baseline** response—expected by default in normal use—is simply that the hearer attend to the expression and interpret it in accordance with established patterns.
- (3)(a) Language has a **symbolic** function (allowing the symbolization of conceptualizations) as well as a multifaceted **interactive** function (involving communication, manipulation, social communion, expressiveness).
  - (b) In varying degrees, symbolic expressions have a **descriptive** and/or an **expressive/emotive** function (e.g. *That is disgusting* vs. *Yuck!*).
  - (c) Particular expressions or structural elements serve more specific functions.
- (4)(a) The **objective scene** (OS) is the situation put onstage as the general object of description.
  - (b) Any portion of our mental world can appear in this "window", even facets of the ground.
  - (c) The *substrate* shapes an expression's form by determining how much has to be put onstage and described explicitly (rather than being presupposed as the *basis* for description).




(6) **Q:** Does {the current US president / Obama / he} play basketball? **A:** Yes, he does.






(8)


(a) She ordered him to stop.




(b) I order you to stop.




(c) You stop!




(d) Stop!



(e) You will stop.




(f) You will stop!



- (9)(a) In the broad sense (descriptive vs. expressive/emotive), even pronouns are descriptions.
  - (b) Questions and commands *incorporate* descriptions, which specify the situation being **negotiated** by the interlocutors.
  - (c) As mere description, *statement* represents a *baseline* serving as the foundation for other, more elaborate **speech act**s.
  - (d) A **clause** is a basic *descriptive unit* and a basic unit of *discourse*.
- (10)(a) [What's Obama doing? He's] playing basketball.
  - (b) He fouled Michelle / so she picked up the ball / and she threw it at him.
  - (c) \*Obama. / Michelle. / The ball.
- (11)(a) Nominals and clauses serve specific functions that contribute to the global descriptive function of language.
  - (b) A clause describes **occurrences**: both *bounded events* and *stable situations* ("states").
  - (c) Nominals serve to coordinate **mental reference**: at least momentarily, the interlocutors focus their attention on the same *thing* (out of all those we might conceive of).

(12)



- (13)(a) To some extent, linguistic elements are organized into **systems** representing alternate means of fulfilling a given function.
  - (b) A function is often decomposable into **subfunctions**, each with its own subsystem.
  - (c) For the same function, there may be different **strategies** (hence different subfunctions).
- (14)(a) One strategy for the function of *nominal reference* involves the subfunctions of **type** specification and grounding (e.g. *this diamond*).
  - (b) **Lexical nouns** comprise a system of established options for making a *type specification*.
  - (c) A **determiner system** provides a set of alternatives for the *grounding* function.
  - (d) Proper names and pronouns represent different referential strategies.
- (15)(a) **Grammar** consists in patterns for combining elements to form complex expressions.
  - (b) Grammar is *motivated* by the functions served, and reflects this functional organization to varying degrees, but cannot simply be *identified* with this organization.
  - (c) Alternate strategies result in the same function being served by different structures.
  - (d) By itself, a functional relationship between two elements does not determine the specific details of their structural combination.
  - (e) Elements serving the same function can occupy different structural positions.
  - (f) The elements serving a function may be *non-contiguous* (not forming a constituent).
  - (g) A basically regular correlation between elements and functions can be complicated by factors like *zero members*, *analyzability*, *conflation*, and *preemption*.
- (16)(a) The package that you were expecting just arrived.
  - (b) The package just arrived that you were expecting.

(17)

Function 1		
Function 2		Function 3
Function 4	Function 4 Function 5	
Λ	C	Е
A	C	F
В	D	G
Б	D	Н

ACE	ADE	BCE	BDE
ACF	ADF	BCF	BDF
ACG	ADG	BCG	BDG
ACH	ADH	BCH	BDH

- (18)(a) **Zero** ( $\emptyset$ ) is one member of the system of indefinite articles: He ate  $\{a \mid sm \mid \emptyset\}$  fish.
  - (b) The plural demonstratives are only partially analyzable: these  $\neq$  this + -s PL.
  - (c) *People* represents the essentially unanalyzable conflation of *person* + PL.
  - (d) **Preemption:** A specific structure is well enough entrenched that it occurs in lieu of another, more regular structure that would otherwise be expected (*thief* vs. ?stealer).

(19)


(a) Zero Member

(b) Partial Analyzability

(c) Conflation

В	D

Δ	$\boldsymbol{C}$
Λ	C
D	D
D	υ



(20)

(a) Systemic View

Function 1	Function 2
A	D
В	E
С	F

(b) Regular Paradigm

	Function 1		
n 2	AD	BD	CD
Function 2	ΑE	BE	CE
Fui	AF	BF	CF


(c) Preemption


	Function 1		
n 2	AD	BD	CD
unction 2	AE	BE	G
Fu	AF	BF	CF

- (21)(a) Often a tightly integrated system has a privileged member that is **zero** in terms of its *form* and the **default** in terms of ease, likelihood, or frequency of *occurrence*.
  - (b) This member may be best analyzed as a **baseline** in terms of *conceptual complexity* (a *point of departure* for characterizing other members).

(22)







### C. Basic Clauses

(1) Basic clauses (description)

I like her. (baseline 1)
He bought a shirt. (baseline 2)


She was followed. (perspectival adjustment 1)
She was being followed. (perspectival adjustment 2)
She had been being followed. (perspectival adjustment 3)


She may have been being followed. (modality 1)
She might have been being followed. (modality 2)

Elaborated clauses (negotiation)

She does like him. (polarity 1)
She wasn't followed. (polarity 2)
Had she been being followed? (questioning)

(2)





- (3)(a) In the **baseline substrate**, the interlocutors are together in a fixed location, from which they *observe and describe occurrences* in the world around them.
  - (b) Since mere *description* is involved, the *speech act* is that of **stating** (the baseline).
  - (c) In the absence of *negotiation*, the description is aimed at the minimum **hearer response**: the baseline of *attending* to the description and *interpeting* it in the normal way.
  - (d) Since the interlocutors *observe* the occurrences they describe, these occurrences must be **real** (the baseline *epistemic status*).
- (4)(a) Out of all the conceivable occurrences in our world, only some are actually "realized", i.e. manifested through time. The passage of time thus establishes a particular *history* of realized occurrences (the "course of events").
  - (b) Each of us has partial knowledge of this history. For a given conceptualizer (C), **reality** (R) is what C accepts as the *established history of occurrences* (what C "knows").
  - (c) We have direct access to the *present*, so we can *know* of present situations through immediate experience. This constitutes **baseline knowledge**.
  - (d) The *past* can only be accessed indirectly, via memory. Still, we can *know* of past occurrences because they were at one time immediate and directly accessible.
  - (e) We cannot really *know* of future events. Since the future has not yet arrived, they do not now belong to the history of occurrences established by their temporal realization.

Non-Immediate Reality

t established history of occurrences

C undetermined

R

- (6)(a) A **baseline clause** presupposes and conforms to the baseline substrate, so there is no need for any element serving to make the baseline explicit or indicate any departure from it.
  - (b) Such a clause need only have a verb, to specify a basic *process type*, and nominal expressions to identify central participants not evident from the discourse context.
  - (c) Not required are elements like negation, modals, or explicit indication of the speech act.

(7)

	SG	PL
1	Ø	Ø
2	Ø	Ø
3	-S	Ø

(b) Past

	SG	PL
1	-d	-d
2	-d	
3	- '	-d

(c) Tense System


Tense
Ø
-d

(8)

(a) Baseline and Derivations




(b) Epistemic Path





- (9)(a) In baseline clauses, tense (indicating epistemic status) is registered on the **lexical verb** (V). A verb profiles a **process**: a relationship tracked in its evolution through time.
  - (b) In lieu of a lexical verb, the semantic function of specifying a **process type** can be fulfilled by using *be* plus an adjective or prepositional phrase: *She is {tall / in the yard}*.
  - (c) *Be* profiles a **schematic process**: an unspecified relationship is scanned through time. An adjective or prepositional phrase profiles a **specific** but **non-processual** relationship (one fully manifested at a single point in time). *Be* gives it temporal extension.
  - (d) Thus  $be + \{ADJ/PP\}$  tracks a specific relationship through time, making it a complex verb. The construction factors out, for separate expression, conceptual elements that a lexical verb conflates in a single morphological package.
- (10)(a) BE- and HAVE-type verbs commonly indicate **existence** (hay; il y a; there is).
  - (b) For an object, existence is *manifestation in space*. Analogously, existence for an event—what we call its **occurrence**—is *manifestation in time*.
  - (c) A **process** is just the existence of a relationship (its temporal realization). Every verb incorporates the existence of a relationship as its *schematic conceptual core*.
- (11)(a) A clause profiles a process, so it describes ("predicates") the existence of a relationship.
  - (b) In baseline clauses, existence is predicated by either a lexical verb (v) or "copular" be.
  - (c) Tense specifies the *epistemic status* (immediate vs. non-immediate) of this predication.
  - (d) The verb bearing tense is called the **existential verb** (He bought a shirt; She is tall).
- (12)(a) AUX  $\rightarrow$  TNS (M) (have + -en) (be + -ing) (be + -ed)
  - (b) [NP] [ [TNS M have -en be -ing be -ed] [V] ]
  - (c) [NP TNS M] [have -en be -ing be -ed V]
- (13)(a) She may, unfortunately, have been waiting.
  - $(b) \ensuremath{\,?}{}^*She\ may\ have\ been,\ unfortunately,\ waiting.$
- (14)(a) Whereas tense (TNS) and the modals (M) serve a **grounding** function, specifying the *epistemic status* of a profiled occurrence (**p**), the passive, progressive, and perfect constructions impose a **non-neutral perspective** on the lexical process.
  - (b) The perspectival constructions are parallel in form (schematic verb + participle), occur contiguously in a rigid order, and are permitted in complements marked by *to* and *-ing*.
  - (c) Passive: be + Ved Progressive: be + Ving Perfect: have + Ven


(15)(a) He is likely [to have been being criticized]. Cf. \*He is likely [to {fails/might fail}]. (b) He dislikes [having been being criticized]. Cf. \*He dislikes [{faileding/maying fail}].




- (17)(a) Since evolution through time is backgrounded, the participles are non-processual and can function as adjectives: *an antelope chased by lions*; *the monkey climbing that tree*.
  - (b) For clausal use, they combine with *be* or *have*, which serves to track the *participial* relationship through time, thus producing a derived, **perspectivized** process.
- (18)(a) [Perfect [Progressive [Passive [Lexical Verb]]]] (have been being pursued)
  - (b) This layering is indicated morphologically: the passive -ed appears on V, the progressive -ing appears on passive be, and the perfect -en appears on progressive be.
  - (c) The layering is iconic, reflecting how intrinsically the lexical process is affected.









- (23)(a) Modals are **force-dynamic**: they specify some *tendency* for **p** to be realized, with the different modals indicating the relative *strength* of that impetus.
  - (b) **Root modals** express *social force* directed at the hearer, who realizes **p** at the *effective* level (i.e. by acting in the world): You {must / should / may} buy those shoes.
  - (c) **Epistemic modals** express the *mental force* experienced by the speaker in *simulating* the growth of reality so that it comes to encompass **p**, which is realized by being accepted in the speaker's conception of reality: They {must / should / may} be home by now.
- (24)(a) Tense and the modals form a basic system subserving the function of clausal **grounding**.
  - (b) Each invokes a facet of the ground (or "deictic center") and situates **p** in relation to it: the time of speaking and the speaker's conception of reality (R).
  - (c) They function alike in complementation [see (15)].
  - (d) They fuse into words with specialized meanings (*might*, *could*, *would*, *should*).
  - (e) They do not profile this grounding relationship, but  $\mathbf{p}$  itself (schematically characterized).

(25)(a) **A:** You should buy those shoes.

(b) **A:** Will they finish on time?

B: Yes, I should.

B: Yes, they will.


(26)

(a) Systemic View

Immediacy	Modality
	Ø
Ø	may
[ J	can
	will
-d	shall
	must

(b) Paradigmatic View

	Absence of Modal	Presence of Modal
Immediate	Ø	may, can, will, shall, must
Non- Immediate	-d	might, could, would, should



- (28)(a) The non-immediate forms of the modals consistently indicate greater **epistemic distance** than the immediate forms (e.g. *I will quit if I can* vs. *I would quit if I could*).
  - (b) With modals, immediacy vs. non-immediacy is a matter of whether IR functions **directly** or only **indirectly** as the *basis for modal assessment*.
- (29)(a) The **existential verb**  $(V_3)$  can be characterized as the *word* expressing the process profiled at the highest level of conceptual organization.
  - (b) Starting from the lexical verb, **grounding** (where only modals are words) represents the highest level, i.e. the outermost layer in regard to conceptual elaboration (semantic scope): [Grounding [Perfect [Progressive [Passive [Lexical Verb]]]]].
  - (c) Modals depart from the baseline by invoking a more elaborate conceptual substrate in which we not only *observe and describe* occurrences, but are also able to **imagine** occurrences outside the established course of events.
  - (d) Thus they **qualify** the existential predication by indicating that it is only found in this much broader epistemic landscape: *realization* of the profiled occurrence (acceptance by the speaker as part of the established course of events) is at best *potential*.

(30)

(a) may eat

$$-\frac{(r)\exists}{V} \Rightarrow_{\bigoplus} -\frac{\exists'}{M} - \Rightarrow_{\bigoplus}$$

(b) may have eaten

$$-\frac{(r)\exists}{V} \Rightarrow_{\bullet} -\frac{r'}{B} \xrightarrow{PRTC} \Rightarrow_{\bullet} -\frac{\exists}{A} \xrightarrow{\bullet} \Rightarrow_{\bullet} -\frac{\exists'}{M} \xrightarrow{\bullet} \Rightarrow_{\bullet}$$

r = relationship

 $\exists$  = existence

B = baseline conception

r' = perspectivally adjusted relationship

 $\exists' = \text{qualified existence}$ (potentiality)

(31)

- (a) Immediacy (b) Non-Immediacy
- (c) Schema



#### **D. Elaborated Clauses**

- (1)(a) A finite clause expresses a **proposition**: it profiles a process (**p**) and, through grounding, indicates its epistemic status. Whether this proposition reflects the speaker's actual view depends on how it is used at higher levels of organization.
  - (b) By itself, a finite clause does not represent a speech act or reflect the reality conception of any particular conceptualizer. Its canonical interpretation as a statement reflecting the speaker's actual view is due to the default-case status of the baseline substrate.
  - (c) Being independent of any particular conceptualizer, a proposition is subject to **negotiation** by the interlocutors. From a basic clause, negotiation derives an elaborated clause.
- (2)(a) Bush is honest, intelligent, and well-informed.
  - (b) Bush is honest, intelligent, and well-informed? You've got to be kidding.
  - (c) Cheney maintains that Bush is honest, intelligent, and well-informed.
  - (d) It's blatantly false that Bush is honest, intelligent, and well-informed.
  - (e) Bush is honest, intelligent, and well-informed. And I'm the King of Spain.
- (3) Negotiating stances in regard to the basic proposition expressed by a clause:
  - (a) **Question** (Q): Has Bush ever accepted responsibility for his actions?
  - (b) **Negative** (NEG): No, he hasn't ever accepted responsibility for anything.
  - (c) **Affirmative** (AFF): He HAS however claimed credit for deposing Saddam Hussein.
  - [baseline; non-negotiation] (d) **Positive** (POS): *He has always avoided responsibility.*

(4)


Elaborated Clause				
Interactive Grounding	Basic Clause			
interactive Grounding	Basic Grounding	Grounded Structure		
polarity illocutionary force multiple conceptualizers	tense	lexical verb		
	modality	perspectival elements		
	one conceptualizer	complements		
	Negotiable Proposition			
Negotiated Proposition				

(5)

- /	·					
		Q	NEG	AFF	POS	
	M	Will she wait?	She <b>won't</b> wait.	She WILL wait.	She <b>will</b> wait.	
	have	<b>Has</b> she waited?	She <b>hasn't</b> waited.	She HAS waited.	She <b>has</b> waited.	
	be	<b>Is</b> she waiting?	She <b>isn't</b> waiting.	She IS waiting.	She <b>is</b> waiting.	

- (6)(a) [[[Existential Predication] Tense] Polarity] Illocutionary Force]
  - (b) *Hadn't I* waited? = [[[[have] PAST] NEG] Q]
  - (c) *I hadn't* waited. = [[[have] PAST] NEG]
  - (d) I had waited. = [[have]] PAST]
  - (e) *I have* waited. = [have]

(7) Existential Verb  $(V_3)$ 




(8)

	Q	NEG	AFF	POS
M	Will she wait?	She won't wait.	She will wait.	She <b>will</b> wait.
have	<b>Has</b> she waited?	She <b>hasn't</b> waited.	She HAS waited.	She <b>has</b> waited.
be	<b>Is</b> she waiting?	She <b>isn't</b> waiting.	She IS waiting.	She <b>is</b> waiting.
do	<b>Did</b> she wait?	She <b>didn't</b> wait.	She <b>DID</b> wait.	*She <b>did</b> wait.

(9)


	Q	NEG	AFF	POS
M	Will she wait?	She <b>won't</b> wait.	She WILL wait.	She <b>will</b> wait.
have	<b>Has</b> she waited?	She <b>hasn't</b> waited.	She HAS waited.	She <b>has</b> waited.
be	<b>Is</b> she waiting?	She <b>isn't</b> waiting.	She IS waiting.	She <b>is</b> waiting.
do	<b>Did</b> she wait?	She <b>didn't</b> wait.	She DID wait.	She waited.

- (10)(a) **Preemption:** The lexical verb (v) appears in lieu of do + v in simple positive statements.
  - (b) As the only verb in its clause, V is the **existential verb** and bears tense.
  - (c) It cannot serve as  $V_3$  when existence is being negotiated: \*Waited she?; \*She waited not.
  - (d) The preemptive role of V reflects the default-case status of the *baseline substrate*, where the interlocutors merely *observe and describe* real occurrences.
  - (e) With a departure from the baseline in any dimension (modal qualification, perspectival adjustment, negotiation), V is superseded by a *higher-level existential predicate*.
- (11)(a) *Do* profiles a **maximally schematic process**. It is equivalent to the existential predication serving as the *schematic conceptual core* of lexical verbs.
  - (b) The combination do + v is redundant, since do and v are schematic and specific representations of the **same occurrence**. In the baseline situation, v suffices.
  - (c) *Do* appears when existence is at issue and being **negotiated**, indicating departure from the baseline in this respect. With its central status, existence needs separate expression.
  - (d) Do is mutually exclusive with have, be, and M: \*She does have waited; \*She has done wait; \*She does be waiting; \*She is doing wait; \*She does may wait; \*She may do wait.
  - (e) With have, be, or M, do would be superfluous, since they themselves express existence.
- (12)(a) V functions as the existential verb only in expressions that conform to the baseline substrate in three respects: (i) **p** is apprehended in neutral perspective; (ii) it is viewed as real; and (iii) the clause is offered as a simple, positive statement.
  - (b) Do functions instead as V<sub>3</sub> when only conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied.
  - (c) Otherwise, the existential verb is have, be, or M.



- (14)(a) Accent and word order are basic ways of symbolizing aspects of **information structure**.
  - (b) **New information** (full description) vs. **old information** (reduced description, including **anaphora**). **Q:** *Does Obama play basketball?* **A:** *Yes, he DOES.*
  - (c) The **focus** in an expression is the most informative element or the center of interest.
  - (d) The **topic** of a sentence is "what the sentence is about".

- (15)(a) Many aspects of language structure exhibit a **fractal** arrangement, whereby analogous configurations occur at multiple levels of organization.
  - (b) A **topic** can function at the discourse, sentence, or clause level.
  - (c) **Q:** What do you think about **Obama**? **A:** Well, he plays basketball. He has a nice family. He's tall and thin. He has had trouble giving up smoking...
  - (d) *Obama*, he's always playing basketball.
  - (e) Basketball he really likes. Tennis he doesn't.
- (16)(a) {The president | In his private office | Right now | With his advisors | Patiently | Evidently | Because he has to}, he's working on the new budget proposals.
  - (b) An **anchor** is an instruction to interpret a proposition with respect to a particular domain of knowledge or a certain aspect of the situation described. It "frames" the proposition and serves as initial point of access (reference point) for presenting or apprehending it.




- (19)(a) The **basic existential core** of a clause is a *functional grouping* that includes the subject, the existential verb, polarity, and illocutionary force (as indicated by word order).
  - (b) The **elaborated existential core** includes a variety of additional elements allowing a more refined expression of negation or questioning:
    - (i) **Question words:** who, what, why, where, when, how, etc.
    - (ii) **Negatives:** not ever, never, nor, neither, in no way
    - (iii) **Restrictives:** *seldom*, *hardly ever*, *scarcely ever*, *only X*, *barely*
- (20)(a) **A:** The president shouldn't be lying to us, <u>should he</u>? **B:** No, <u>he shouldn't</u>.
  - (b) **A:** You've finished your homework, <u>have you</u>? **B:** Yes, <u>I have</u>.
  - (c) **A:** The students are still complaining, <u>aren't they</u>? **B:** Yes, <u>they are</u>.
  - (d) **A:** He DID fix the computer, <u>didn't he</u>? **B:** No, <u>he didn't</u>, actually.

- (21)(a) You will, I think, be pleased with the results.
  - (b) Are they, perhaps, less trustworthy than we thought?
  - (c) *He did not*, apparently, notice that anything was wrong.
  - (d) *She has*, it seems, been working hard all afternoon.
  - (e) ?? She has been, it seems, working hard all afternoon.
- (22)(a) With a subject pronoun, the basic existential core provides a **schematic representation** of the proposition being negotiated. It gives a *preview* of the clause as a whole.
  - (b) This preview contains the most essential elements relating to knowledge and negotiation: (i) the highest-level existential predication; (ii) its epistemic status (through basic grounding); (iii) the nature of the negotiation (interactive grounding); and (iv) the central participant (subject)—the nominal referent to which it all pertains.
  - (c) The core is thus a natural **starting point** for presenting the clausal material.
  - (d) In its basic word order, English quite efficiently begins a clause with *two* natural starting points: the *basic existential core*, and within that, the *subject*.
- (23)(a) *Floyd broke* the glass.
  - (b) ?? Floyd broke, I think, the glass.
  - (c) \*Floyd didn't break the glass, broke he?
  - (d) **Q:** <u>Did Floyd</u> break the glass? **A:** ??Yes, <u>Floyd did</u>.
- (24)(a) \*Your parents seldom complain, do they seldom?
  - (b) **A:** Your parents seldom complain. **B:** No, they seldom do. Neither do I. Why would I?
- (25)(a) *He has* {*never | seldom | barely | only recently*}, it seems, been able to walk very far.
  - (b) She can play the piano, but she {never | seldom | hardly ever | scarcely ever} does.
- (26)(a) Who was she waiting for?
  - (b) *Never* will she wait for her brother.
  - (c) <u>Seldom has she</u> waited for me.
  - (d) In no way was she willing to wait.
  - (e) Only with her iPod does she not mind waiting.
- (27)(a) **Me** she would never wait for.
  - (b) *There she waited for several hours*.
  - (c) Finally she got tired of waiting.
  - (d) For several hours she waited patiently.
  - (e) With her iPod she didn't mind waiting.
- (28)(a) As a case of *fractal organization*, English shows the same basic scheme for word order at the sentence, clause, and core levels: [Anchor > Existential Element > Remainder].
  - (b) The whole at one level functions as the existential element at the next higher level:
    - (i) Sentence = [Anchor > Clause > Remainder]
    - (ii) Clause = [Anchor > Existential Core > Remainder]
    - (iii) Existential Core = [**Anchor** > <u>Existential Verb</u> > Remainder]
  - (c) At each level, either a participant or a circumstantial element can serve as anchor.
  - (d) In each case the *existential element* can itself serve as *anchor*, thus **conflating** the roles.


- (29)(a) Participant anchor: *Her brother*, she was waiting for him all morning, evidently.
  - (b) Locational anchor: *Last night*, *she was waiting for her brother*, *she says*.
  - (c) Existential anchor: She was waiting for her brother all morning, it turns out.
- (30)(a) Participant anchor: *Her brother* she was waiting for all morning.
  - (b) Locational anchor: All morning she was waiting for her brother.
  - (c) Existential anchor: **She was** waiting for her brother all morning.
- (31)(a) Participant anchor: She <u>hasn't</u> ever [waited for you].
  - (b) Locational anchor: *Never* <u>has</u> she [waited for you].
  - (c) Existential anchor: <u>Hasn't</u> she ever [waited for you]?

(32)




(33)

(a)



(34)





(35)

Clause				
Anchor/Existential Core			Remainder	
Anchor	$V_{\exists}$	Remainder	Remanidei	
She	waited		for you.	
She	didn't		wait for you.	
She	is		waiting for you.	
She	may	not ever	wait for you.	
She	hasn't	ever	waited for you.	
Never	has	she	waited for you.	
Seldom	did	she	wait for you.	
Only then	will	she	wait for you.	
What	is	she	waiting for?	
Did		she not	wait for you?	
Hasn't		she ever	waited for you?	

- (36)(a) The configuration in (34), with no differentiation between anchor and existential element, is the **baseline** situation with respect to *interaction and information structure*.
  - (b) Without special framing, it is optimal for a clause to be *doubly anchored* by its existential core (offering a preview of the whole) and the subject (the natural starting point).
  - (c) This is the baseline for a *system* of clause-level anchoring and framing.
  - (d) \*Me seldom has she waited for.

(37)





(41)

Clause				
Ancho	Anchor/Existential Core			
Anchor	$V_{\exists}$	Remainder	Remainder	
She	waited		for you.	
She	DID	wait	for you.	
She	didn't	wait	for you.	
*She	waited	not	for you.	
*Wai	*Waited		for you?	
Die	Did		wait for you?	
Who	waited		for you?	
*Who	did		wait for you?	
Who	DID		wait for you?	
Who	didn't		wait for you?	
*Who	waited	not	for you?	
*Where	waited	she	for you?	
Where	did	she	wait for you?	

- (42)(a) The lexical verb serves as existential verb only in the **baseline situation**: the *absence* of (i) modal qualification, (ii) perspectival adjustment, (iii) negotiation of the existential predication, and (iv) special framing (resulting in a non-subject anchor).
  - (b) Do functions instead as V<sub>3</sub> when (i) and (ii) are satisfied, but not both (iii) and (iv).
  - (c) Otherwise, the existential verb is have, be, or M.
- (43)(a) Conditions (iii) and (iv) are both satisfied only in simple, **positive statements** (*She waited*) and **positive subject questions** (*Who waited?*).
  - (b) A positive statement lacks negotiation and the subject appears in anchor position.
  - (c) A positive subject question **presupposes** occurrence of the profiled process—negotiation is directed at identification of the central participant. And in subject questions, the *special framing* associated with question words does *not* result in a non-subject anchor.
  - (d) In affirmative and negative subject questions (*Who DID wait?*; *Who didn't wait?*), existence is being negotiated in the sense that the presupposition of each is considered in relation to its opposite (e.g. *Who DID wait?*, with its presupposition that someone waited, is used in response to the proposition that others didn't).
  - (e) Yes/no questions (*Did she wait?*) violate condition (iii), as existence is being negotiated.
  - (f) Non-subject content questions (e.g. *Where did she wait?*) violate condition (iv) because their special framing results in a non-subject anchor.
- (44) **Grammar is meaningful.** To make sense of it, we have to view it in terms of semantic functions, conceptual substrates, baseline configurations, and departures from these in various dimensions and at multiple levels of organization.

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